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ABSTRACT
The on-going transformation from the current US Air Traf-
ﬁc System (ATS) to the Next Generation Air Trafﬁc System
(NextGen) will force the introduction of new automated sys-
tems and most likely will cause automation to migrate from
ground to air. This will yield new function allocations be-
tween humans and automation and therefore change the roles
and responsibilities in the ATS. Yet, safety in NextGen is re-
quired to be at least as good as in the current system. We
therefore need techniques to evaluate the safety of the inter-
actions between humans and automation. We think that cur-
rent human factor studies and simulation-based techniques
will fall short in front of the ATS complexity, and that we
need to add more automated techniques to simulations, such
as model checking, which offers exhaustive coverage of the
non-deterministic behaviors in nominal and off-nominal sce-
narios. In this work, we present a veriﬁcation approach based
both on simulations and on model checking for evaluating the
roles and responsibilities of humans and automation. Mod-
els are created using Brahms (a multi-agent framework) and
we show that the traditional Brahms simulations can be inte-
grated with automated exploration techniques based on model
checking, thus offering a complete exploration of the behav-
ioral space of the scenario. Our formal analysis supports the
notion of beliefs and probabilities to reason about human be-
havior. We demonstrate the technique with the U¨berligen ac-
cident since it exempliﬁes authority problems when receiving
conﬂicting advices from human and automated systems.
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Over the past few years, the US has embarked in a transfor-
mation of the Air Transportation System (ATS) to address the
expected increase of air trafﬁc in the US. The original predic-
tion is that the trafﬁc in 2025 will be between two and three
times greater than the current trafﬁc. There is no consensus
on the actual size, but everybody agrees that the US needs to
modernize the ATS and to implement NexGen (Next Gener-
ation Air Transportation System) to accommodate the trafﬁc
increase over the next 15 years; Europe is going through a
similar effort with SESAR. An important goal of NexGen is
to increase efﬁciency without compromising safety. The im-
plementation of NexGen, described in the IntegratedWorking
Plan (IWP), will see the introduction of new automated sys-
tems (e.g., ADS-B, GPS-based navigation) and new air traf-
ﬁc paradigms (e.g., 4D trajectory), which will cause some Air
TrafﬁcManagement (ATM) functions to migrate from ground
to on-board, and possibly vice versa. The new automation
will cause a change in function allocation as well as a change
in roles and responsibilities for air trafﬁc controllers and pi-
lots. As a consequence, it poses new challenges in assessing
the safety of the overall system. This is the focus of our work.
The US National Airspace System (NAS) is currently quite
safe and accidents are at a record low. NexGen needs to pro-
vide at least the same, if not a better, level of safety. The
NexGen IWP has a requirement (R-1440) that calls for new
and improved veriﬁcation and validation (V&V) techniques
for complex systems. This is often understood as applying
only to the software systems that will be used in NexGen.
However, we also need to recognize that NexGen is a com-
plex system in which humans and autonomy (or automation:
we do not need to make a distinction in this work) are in-
teracting in quite subtle ways. Therefore, we also need new
safety evaluation techniques to verify and validate the inter-
actions of humans and autonomy in the complex system that
is NexGen. Moreover, there is a large consensus that the ear-
lier in the lifecycle this V&V is done, the easier it is to de-
tect and ﬁx errors [5]. In our work, we are focusing on de-
veloping methods for evaluating early, in the design phase,
models of complex interactions in which there are multiple,
different, simultaneous, situation-dependent assignments of
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authority and autonomy (A&A) among humans and automa-
tion. In order to ensure safety in NexGen, there is a need for
well-deﬁned formalizations of procedures, possible actions of
the actors involved, and the consequences of the actions. The
formalization should facilitate the analysis of various inter-
actions between the actors; the analysis can either be simula-
tions or formal search-based techniques such as model check-
ing. We speciﬁcally need to develop methods that allow us to
articulate the authority bounds (limits) and behavior in terms
of ownership: who has authority in any situation and how
it may affect safety. The deﬁnitions that we adopt simpliﬁed
deﬁnitions for authority and autonomy in this work are as fol-
lows:
• Authority refers to having the right, or power, to exercise
controls or issue air trafﬁc commands that impact the posi-
tion, velocity, and/or attitude of aircraft during operations.
• Autonomy (or automation) refers to a function or system
that can operate independently of pilot or air trafﬁc con-
troller intervention.
The ATS, especially with future NexGen concepts of oper-
ation, is a complex system involving dynamic interactions
among multiple actors that are largely governed through for-
mal assignment of roles and responsibilities. These A&A as-
signments are made at the design level, but are executed at the
operational level according to each actor’s view of its roles
and responsibilities. Operationally, the system continuously
adjusts for shortcomings in the assignment of authority and
autonomy, for shortcomings in the capacity of actors to per-
form their assigned roles and responsibilities, and to optimize
various performance factors such as capacity, environmental
impact, and safety. This suggests that system safety should
be derived not only from a predictable execution of assigned
roles and responsibilities but also from checks and balances to
ensure that the system operates as designed in the face of fail-
ures, disturbances and degradations. The ability of the system
to operate in off-nominal conditions as a result of the checks
and balances extent in it provides resilience, a critical charac-
teristic for system safety.
Assessing safety in human-automation systems can be done
using several techniques. Historically, human-in-the-loop
studies have been the most prominent ones [4, 20]. They are
quite costly to perform (they are real-time studies in which
humans interact with ATS simulations), somewhat limited in
scale (it is difﬁcult to pull many controllers into a study) and
often incomplete in the sense that they can explore only a
restrictive set of behaviors. A few user interface rules have
been extracted from these studies and can be used as build-
ing blocks to design the system interfaces. However, these
rules fall short in helping in the context of a highly dynamic
and complex system such as the ATS. Another way of an-
alyzing human-machine systems is to create models for the
humans (often based on the procedures that need to be per-
formed by the humans) and run simulations [15, 18, 21]
with the shortcoming that simulations can only examine a
restricted set of behaviors. There has also been a growing
interest and research in using formal methods for assessing
safety in human-automation systems, particularly in the avia-
tion domain. They have the potential of exploring all possible
behaviors given an sufﬁciently complex model for the human
and the systems. Early examples of the use of model check-
ing for analyzing human-machine interactions are described
in [8, 13, 22]. More recent examples try to bridge the gap
between simulations and the use of model checking [3, 6, 7].
The analysis method is model checking but the representa-
tion of the problem (i.e., models for the human and the au-
tomation) uses simulation languages instead of fairly simple
ﬁnite state models. These techniques can even be expanded to
the design and the veriﬁcation of aerospace systems [2]. Our
work falls in the category of using both simulation languages
and formal methods. Our innovation resides in using a simu-
lation language deﬁned for representing multi-agent systems,
which is what the ATS really is: a complex system of inter-
acting agents some of which are humans and some of which
are automated systems. But we also integrate the simulation
language with formal veriﬁcation techniques based on model
checking.
Concretely, we model systems in the Brahms multi-agent
framework [11, 24]. Brahms is a multi-agent simulation sys-
tem in which people, tools, facilities, vehicles, and geogra-
phy are modeled explicitly. The air transportation system
is modeled as a collection of distributed, interactive subsys-
tems such as airports, air-trafﬁc control towers and personnel,
aircraft, automated ﬂight systems and air-trafﬁc tools, instru-
ments, and ﬂight crew. Each subsystem, whether a person or
a tool such as the radar, is modeled independently with prop-
erties and contextual behaviors. Brahms facilitates modeling
various conﬁgurable realistic scenarios that allows the anal-
ysis of the airspace in various conditions and reassignment
of roles and responsibilities among human and automation.
We then apply formal methods to the proposed concepts and
conﬁgurations early in the development process to identify
promising candidates for safe solutions, as well as ﬁnd de-
sign problems when they are easier to ﬁx. This combination
of modeling and formal methods will increase assurance of
safety and motivate adoption of advanced automation and as-
sociated operations protocols. To motivate our approach we
present a generalized air transportation system model based
on the U¨berlingen collision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: to motivate
our work we ﬁrst describe the conditions that led to the
U¨berlingen collision. Then, we describe how humans and
automation, as well as their interactions, are modeled. Fi-
nally, we then present simulation results and a description the
veriﬁcation framework, and discuss related work.
U¨BERLINGEN COLLISION OVERVIEW
The U¨berlingen accident, [1], involving the (automated) Traf-
ﬁc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), is viewed as a very
good representative example illustrating the problem of au-
thority versus autonomy (A&A) [10]. The U¨berlingen colli-
sion is a paradigmatic example of A&A conﬂicts. In particu-
lar, TCAS has the ability to reconﬁgure the pilot and air trafﬁc
control center (ATCC) relationship, taking authority from the
air trafﬁc control ofﬁcer (ATCO) and instructing the pilot.
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TCAS
TCAS is an onboard aircraft system that uses radar transpon-
der signals to operate independently of ground-based equip-
ment to provide advice to the pilot about conﬂicting air-
craft that are equipped with the same transponder/TCAS
equipment. The history of TCAS dates at least to the late
1950s. Motivated by a number of mid-air collisions over three
decades, the United States Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) initiated the TCAS program in 1981. The system in
use over U¨berlingen in 2002 was TCAS II v.7, which had
been installed by US carriers since 1994:
TCAS II issues the following types of aural annunciations:
• Trafﬁc advisory (TA)
• Resolution advisory (RA)
• Clear of conﬂict
When a TA is issued, pilots are instructed to initiate a visual
search, if possible, for the trafﬁc causing the TA. In the cases
when the trafﬁc can be visually acquired, pilots are instructed
to maintain visual separation from the trafﬁc. When an RA
is issued, pilots are expected to respond immediately to the
RA unless doing so would jeopardize the safe operation of
the ﬂight. The separation timing, called TAU, provides the
TA alert at about 48 seconds and the RA at 35 seconds prior
to a predicted collision.
U¨berlingen Collision Narrative
On July 1 2002, a midair collision between a Tupolev Tu-
154M passenger jet travelling from Moscow to Barcelona,
and a Boeing 757-23APF DHL cargo jet manned by two pi-
lots, travelling from Bergamo to Brussels, occurred at 23:35
UTC over the town of U¨berlingen in southern Germany. The
two ﬂights were on a collision course. TCAS issued ﬁrst a
Trafﬁc Advisory (TA) and then a Resolution Advisory (RA)
for each plane. Just before TCAS RA to the Tupolev to climb,
the air trafﬁc controller in charge of the sector issued a com-
mand to descend, which the crew obeyed. Since TCAS had
issued a Resolution Advisory to the Boeing crew to descend
that they immediately followed, both planes were descending
when they collided.
The decision of the Tupolev crew to follow the ATC’s instruc-
tions rather than TCAS was the immediate cause of the acci-
dent. The regulations for the use of TCAS state that in the
case of conﬂicting instructions from TCAS and ATCO, the
pilot should follow the TCAS instructions. The conﬂict in the
U¨berlingen scenario represents the conﬂict between the au-
thority of automated systems (TCAS) and people (crews and
ATC), as well as their autonomy (freedom to act indepen-
dently). The reason this conﬂict came into being is because
the loss of separation between the two planes was not detected
or corrected by the ATCO. The loss of separation between air-
planes are frequent occurrences; it is part of the normal work
of air trafﬁc control to detect and correct them accordingly.
There were a set of complex systemic problems at the Zurich
air trafﬁc control station that caused the ATCO to miss de-
tecting the loss of separation between the two planes. Al-
though two controllers were supposed to be on duty, one of
the two was resting in the lounge: a common and accepted
practice during the lower workload portion of night shift. On
this particular evening, a scheduled maintenance procedure
was being carried out on the main radar system, which meant
that the controller had to use a less capable air trafﬁc tracking
system. The maintenance work also disconnected the phone
system, which made it impossible for other air trafﬁc control
centers in the area to alert the Zurich controller to the prob-
lem. Finally, the controllers workload was increased by a late
arriving plane. An A320 that was landing in Friedrichshafen
required the ATCO’s attention, who then failed to notice the
potential separation infringement of the two planes.
The U¨berlingen collision proves that methods used for cer-
tifying TCAS II v7.0 did not adequately consider human-
automation interactions. In particular, the certiﬁcation
method treated TCAS as if it were ﬂight system automation,
that is, a system that automatically controls the ﬂight of the
aircraft. Instead, TCAS is a system that tells pilot how to
maneuver the aircraft, an instruction that implicitly removes
and/or overrides the ATCs authority. Worldwide deployment
of TCAS II v7.1 was still in process in 2012, a decade after
the U¨berlingen collision.
MODELING THE U¨BERLINGEN WORK SYSTEM
Overview of Brahms
Brahms is a full-ﬂedged multi-agent, rule-based, activity pro-
gramming language. It is based on a theory of work prac-
tice and situated cognitionk [11, 24]. The Brahms language
allows for the representation of situated activities of agents
in a geographical model of the world. Situated activities are
actions performed by the agent in some physical and social
context for a speciﬁed period of time [9]. The execution of
actions is constrained (a) locally: by the reasoning capabili-
ties of an agent and (b) globally by the agents beliefs of the
external world, such as where the agent is located, the state of
the world at that location and elsewhere, located artifacts, ac-
tivities of other agents, and communication with other agents
or artifacts. The objective of Brahms is to represent the in-
teraction between people, off-task behaviors, multi-tasking,
interrupted and resumed activities, informal interactions and
knowledge, while being located in some environment repre-
sentative of the real world.
The Brahms agent language can also be used to develop ex-
ecutable software agents that are based on models of situ-
ated behavior. This allows for the development of intelligent
agents that can act and react to speciﬁc situations that oc-
cur during its execution, and that have been modeled as the
agent’s activity-behavior.
At each clock tick the Brahms simulation engine inspects the
model to update the state of the world, which includes all
of the agents and all of the objects in the simulated world.
Agents and objects have states (factual properties) and may
have capabilities to model the world (e.g., a radar’s display
is modeled as beliefs, which are representations of the state
of the aircraft). Agents and objects communicate with each
other; the communications can represent verbal speech, read-
ing, writing, etc. and may involve devices such as telephones,
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Figure 1. A simpliﬁed overview of the agents, objects, classes in the Brahms U¨berligen Model involving communications
radios, displays, etc. Agents and objects may act to change
their own state, beliefs, or other facts about the world.
Constructs in the Brahms U¨berlingen Model
In a Brahms model, the system being modeled is the entire
work system, including agents, groups to which they belong,
facilities (buildings, rooms, ofﬁces, spaces in vehicles), tools
(e.g., radio, radar display/workstation, telephone, vehicles),
representational objects (e.g., a phone book, a control strip),
and automated subsystems (e.g., TCAS), all located in an ab-
stracted geography represented as areas and paths. Thus the
notion of human-system interaction in Brahms terms is more
precisely an interaction between an agent and a subsystem in
the model; both are behaving within the work system.
A workframe in Brahms can model the interaction between an
agent’s beliefs, perception, and action in a dynamic environ-
ment, for example, these characteristics are leveraged when
modeling how a pilot deploys the aircraft landing gear. A pi-
lot uses the on-board landing control and then conﬁrms that
the landing gears are deployed while monitoring the aircraft’s
trajectory on the Primary Flight Display. This is modeled in
Brahms as follows: a pilot (e.g., the DHL pilot) is a member
of the PilotGroup, which has a composite activity for man-
aging aircraft energy conﬁguration. For further details about
how the different Brahms constructs are used to model the
various aspects of the U¨berlingen collision we refer the reader
to our technical report [10].
A speciﬁc instance of a conceptual class is called a concep-
tual object. A particular ﬂight (e.g., DHX611, a conceptual
object) is operated by a particular airline and consists of a
particular crew (a group) of pilots (agents) who ﬁle a particu-
lar ﬂight plan document (an object), and so on. Each instance
of an agent and object have possible actions deﬁned by work-
frames where each workframe contains a set of activities that
are ordered and often prioritized. Certain workframes are in-
herited from their group (for agents) or class (for objects).
The set of possible actions are modeled at a general level
and all members of a group/class have similar capabilities
(represented as activities, workframes, and thoughtframes);
however, at any time during the simulation, agent and object
behaviors, beliefs, and facts about them will vary depending
on their initial beliefs/facts and the environment with which
they are interacting. The model incorporatesorganizational
and regulatory aspects implicitly, manifest by how work prac-
tices relate roles, tools, and facilities.
A Brahms simulation model conﬁguration consists of the
modeled geography, agents, and objects, as well as their ini-
tial facts and beliefs of agents and objects. The different
conﬁgurations allow us to perform a what-if analysis on the
model. The time of departure for a ﬂight might be an ini-
tial fact in a Brahms model. One can modify the model to
assign a different time of departure for a ﬂight in each simu-
lation run. Another example of conﬁgurable initial facts may
include work schedules for air trafﬁc controllers. In one con-
ﬁguration of the work schedules an air trafﬁc controller may
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be working alone in the ATCC, while in another conﬁgura-
tion, two controllers would be present in the ATCC. Initial
beliefs of an agent might be broad preferences affecting be-
havior (e.g., TCAS should overrule the ATC), thus initial be-
liefs can be used as switches to easily specify alternative con-
ﬁgurations of interest. Alternative conﬁgurations are conven-
tionally called scenarios. Thus for example, a scenario might
be a variation of the U¨berlingen collision in which two air-
craft have inter-route ﬂight times that put them on an inter-
secting path over U¨berlingen; the only other ﬂight is a late
arriving ﬂight for Friedrichshafen and maintenance degrades
the radar, but the telephones are operative.
In general, a model is designed by the model builder with
sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to allow investigating scenarios of inter-
est. The set of causal factors of interest (e.g., use of control
strips when approving aircraft altitude changes, availability
of telephones) constitute states of the world and behaviors
that can be conﬁgured through initial facts and beliefs. The
initial settings deﬁne a space of scenarios. Using Brahms to
evaluate designs within this space, while using formal meth-
ods to help modelers understand its boundaries so they can
reﬁne the model to explore alternative scenarios, constitutes
the main research objective of this work.
The simulation engine determines the state of a modeled ob-
ject (e.g., aircraft). It determines the state of its facts and
beliefs. Some objects are not physical things in the world,
but rather conceptual entities, called conceptual classes in the
Brahms language. These represent processes, a set of people,
physical objects, and locations (e.g., ﬂights), and institutional
systems (e.g., airlines) that people know about and refer to
when organizing their work activities.
High-level Structure of the Brahms U¨berlingen model
An overview of the agents, objects, classes in the Brahms
U¨berlingen model are shown in Figure. 1. All of the systems
that are mentioned in the BFU Report, [1], and play a role in
accident have been modeled; a partial list follows:
1. Agents:
(a) Pilots in each aircraft
(b) Two ATCOs at Zurich
2. Geography:
(a) Airports: Moscow, Bergamo, Barcelona, Brussels
(b) Control Centers at Zurich and Karlsruhe that includes
layout of physical workstations
(c) Aircraft interior layout
3. Objects:
(a) Aircraft: DHL, BTC, AEF, and other aircraft in the
sector during the simulated time period (ﬂights are
conceptual objects associated with these).
(b) Flight Management Computer (FMC) with Cruise &
Standard Terminal Arrival Route (STAR) modes for
DHL & BTC
(c) Control center workstations including radio frequen-
cies and sectors.
4. Activities:
(a) Flight Take-off Phase: Clock in ATCC announcing
time for departure ATCO communicates departure ap-
proval; FMC guides with Standard Instrument Depar-
ture; Pilot activities and communications.
(b) Flight Cruise Phase: FMC ﬂying in auto-pilot mode
using ﬂight plan; Pilot activities and communications.
(c) Flight Phase: Pilot activities and communications;
ATCOs handoff and accept ﬂights.
(d) ATCOs handoff and accept ﬂights
(e) Flight Landing Phase: Pilot requests permission to
land and ATCO communicates approval; FMC guides
with Standard Terminal Arrival Route; Pilot activities
and communications.
Key Subsystems and Conditions
The following key subsystems and conditions are modeled in
the Brahms U¨berlingen model:
1. Interactions among Pilot, Flight Systems, and Aircraft for
climb and cruise with European geography for one plane,
the DHL ﬂight plan.
2. BTC ﬂight, ﬂight plan (two versions: on-time and de-
layed with collision) and geography – this is independent
of ATCO actions, to conﬁrm that simulation reproduces
collision with ﬂight paths actually ﬂown.
3. Radar Systems and Displays with ATCOs, located in Con-
trol Centers, monitoring when ﬂights are entering and ex-
iting each European ﬂight sector in ﬂight plans.
4. Handover interactions between Pilot and ATCOs for each
ﬂight phase.
5. Two ATCOs in Zurich, Radar Planner (RP), and AR-
FARadar Executive (RE), assigned to two workstations
(RE has nothing to do under these conditions).
6. Add TCAS with capability to detect separation violations,
generate Trafﬁc Advisory (TA) and Resolution Advisory
(RA). DHL and BTC are delayed (on collision course,
which tests TCAS)
7. Pilots follow TCAS instructions
8. ATCO may intervene prior to alert depending on when
ATCO notices conﬂict in Radar Displays since ATCO is
busy communicating with other ﬂights, moving between
workstations, and trying to contact Friedrichshafen control
tower on the phone.
9. AEF ﬂight and ﬂight plan so Zurich ARFA RE performs
landing handoff to Friedrichshafen controller.
10. Third plane, the AEF ﬂight, arrives late, requiring ATCO
communications and handoff to Friedrichshafen: (a) Han-
dled by ATCO in Zurich at right workstation (ARFA sec-
tor) and not left East and South sector workstation. (b)
5
Phone communications for handovers, (c) Methods used
by ATCO when phone contact does not work:
(a) Ask Controller Assistant (CA) to get another number
(pass-nr); requires about 3 minutes for CA to return
(b) After pass-nr fails, discuss with CA other options
about 30 sec
(c) When not busy handling other ﬂights, try pass-nr
again.
(d) When plane is at Top-Of-Descent waypoint, as spec-
iﬁed in STAR, for landing at airport, within N nm of
airport, method of last resort is to call pilots on radio
and ask them to contact the tower directly
11. STCA added to ATCO workstations (modeling normal and
fallback mode without optical alert). The ATCO responds
to alert by advising Pilot to change ﬂight level based on
next ﬂight segment of ﬂight plan.
12. Reduce to one Zurich ATCO which triggers the sequence
of variations from the nominal situation; now Zurich
ATCO must operate ﬂights from two workstations.
Note that ﬁg:key does not show the geography, facilities, and
ﬂights.
PROPERTIES OF INTEREST
The question that the analysis tries to answer, using both sim-
ulation and veriﬁcation, is why under certain conditions, a
collision is averted, while in others it is not? In the analysis
we try to gauge how the temporal sensitivity and variability of
the interactions among ATCO, TCAS, and the pilots impacts
the potential loss of separation and collision of the planes.
Concretely, the questions that we ask during the analysis are:
• Given that the arrival of the AEF ﬂight is disrupting the
ATCOs monitoring of the larger airspace (e.g., if it arrives
sufﬁciently late, no collision occurs), what is the period
(relative to the BTC and DHL ﬂights paths) when AEF’s
arrival can cause collision?
• During this period, does a collision always occur or are
there variations of how the AEF handoff occurs, such that
sometimes the separation infringement is averted?
• Is there evidence that high-priority activities such as moni-
toring the sector are repeatedly interrupted or deferred, im-
plying the ATCO is unable to cope with the workload?
SIMULATION OF THE U¨BERLINGEN SCENARIOS
The Brahms U¨berlingen Model deﬁnes a space of work sys-
tems (e.g., is STCA optical functioning? are there two AT-
COs?) and events (e.g., the aircraft and ﬂights). Every con-
ﬁguration of model, which involves conﬁguring initial facts,
beliefs, and agent/object relations, constitutes a scenario that
can be simulated and will itself produce many different out-
comes (chronology of events), because of non-deterministic
timings of agent and object behaviors. The model was de-
veloped and tested with a variety of scenarios (e.g., varying
additional ﬂights in the sector; all subsystems are working
properly). The U¨berlingen accident is of special interest, in
which systems are conﬁgured as they were at the time of the
accident and the DHL and BTC planes are on intersecting
routes.
Setting up the Simulation
The key events that occur during simulation are logged
chronologically in a ﬁle that constitutes a readable trace of the
interactions among the ATCO, pilots, and automated systems.
The log includes information about the following: (a) ATCO-
pilot interaction regarding a route change, including ﬂight
level and climb/descend instruction, (b) Separation violation
events detected by TCAS, including TAU value, (c) Closest
aircraft and separation detected by ATCO when monitoring
radar, (d) STCA optical or aural alerts, including separation
detected, (e) Agent movements (e.g., ATCO shifting between
workstations), (f) Aircraft movements, including departure,
entering and exiting sectors, waypoint arrival, landing, col-
lision, airspeeds, vertical, etc., (g) Aircraft control changes
(e.g., autopilot disengaged), (h) Radio calls, including com-
municated beliefs, (i) Phone calls that fail to complete.
Summary of Results
The outcome of ten simulation runs of Brahms U¨berlingen
model conﬁgured for the collision scenario are shown Fig-
ure. 2. In the simulation runs 1, 2, and 3 shown in Figure. 2,
the ATCO intervenes before TCAS TA, but planes have not
separated sufﬁciently, TCAS will take BTCs descent into ac-
count, advising DHL to climb. In the simulation runs 4, 5, 7,
8, and 9, the ATCO intervenes between TA and RA. In these
runs whether the planes collide depends on timing. As shown
in Figure 2 two of the ﬁve runs results in a collision. Note
that in our model a collision is deﬁned as occurring when the
vertical separation between the planes is less than a 100 feet.
Finally, in the simulation runs 6 and 10, the ATCO intervenes
about 10 seconds after TCAS RA—which BTC pilots ignore
(or might be imagined as discussing for a long time)—BTC
continues ﬂying level while DHL descends, so they miss each
other, separated by more than 600 ft at the crossing point. In
other runs, we have also observed that ATCO intervenes so
late, he actually takes the pilots’ report about TCAS RA in-
structions into account.
When ATCO intervenes in the period between the TA and RA
in runs 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 collision is possible, as at U¨berlingen.
That is, ATCO has to intervene before TA advising BTC de-
scent for BTC to respond sufﬁciently for TCAS to advise
DHL to climb. In runs 4 and 7, collision is narrowly averted
because BTC begins to descend four or ﬁve seconds after the
TCAS RA, which is sufﬁcient for a narrow miss (just over
100 feet). In run 9 the BTC descent begins 5 seconds before
the RA, hence the aircraft miss by more than 200 feet). Runs
5 and 8 (Figure 9-3) lead to collision because the TCAS RA
and BTC AP disengage occur at the same time, as happened
at U¨berlingen. Because the model uses the U¨berlingen de-
scent tables to control the BTC and DHL aircraft during the
emergency descent, simulation matches the paths of the air-
craft at U¨berlingen guaranteeing a collision (within deﬁned
range of error). In both cases, TCAS didn’t instruct DHL to
climb because BTCwas above DHL at that time and of course
had not begun its descent.
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Figure 2. Outcomes of ten simulation runs of U¨berlingen scenario. Bold indicates greatest potential for collision (ATCO intervenes between TA and
RA; both aircraft descending).
When ATCO intervenes after the RA, the BTC pilots in the
simulations ignore the RA advice and continue level ﬂight,
which itself averts the collision—even though ATCO advises
BTC to descend (which implies not considering that DHL is
below them). We of course do not know what the BTC pilots
would have done if ATCO had not intervened. With more
than one pilot interpreting TCAS correctly, it appears possible
the BTC would have climbed.
The ﬁnal AEF hand-off (directing the pilots to contact the
tower) always occurs in the simulation after the TCAS RA;
at U¨berlingen it occurred prior to the TA. This discrepancy
raises many questions about what variability is desirable. In
the veriﬁcation of the system we were able to ﬁnd certain
cases where the ﬁnal AEF hand-off occurs before the TCAS
TA and the planes still collide.
The simulation results for other conﬁgurations of the Brahms
U¨berlingen model are described in the technical report [10].
FORMAL VERIFICATION
We use veriﬁcation techniques to systematically explore
the various behaviors in collision scenario of the Brahms
U¨berlingen model conﬁguration in addition to the simulation
experiments.
Background
In [16] we present an extensible veriﬁcation framework that
takes as input a multi-agent system model and its seman-
tics as input to some state space search engine (or a model
checker). The search engine generates all possible behaviors
of the model with respect to its semantics. The generated be-
haviors of the model are then encoded as a reachability graph
G := 〈N,E〉 where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of
edges. This graph is automatically generated by the search
engine. Each node n ∈ N is labeled with the belief/facts
values of the agents and objects. In the work in [16] we gen-
erate the reachability graph using the Java PathFinder byte-
code analysis framework. An edge between the nodes rep-
resents the updates to beliefs/facts and is also labelled with
probabilities. The reachable states generated by the JPF are
mapped to the nodes in a reachability graph. The veriﬁcation
of safety properties and other reachability properties is per-
formed on-the-ﬂy as new states and transitions are generated
in JPF. Additional veriﬁcation activities can be performed on
the reachability graph after all the JPF states have been gen-
erated.
Limitations The JPF-based MAS connector requires a com-
plete implementation of the Brahms semantics to generate the
intermediate representation. The current implementation of
the Brahms semantics presented in [16] only supports a lim-
ited set of constructs. Furthermore, JPF is a stateful analysis
engine that stores the generated model in memory. Captur-
ing the state of all the agents and objects in Brahms including
their workframes and thoughtframes can lead to large mem-
ory requirements. Additionally, for large systems it is often
intractable to generate and capture even just the intermediate
representation in memory.
Stateless Brahms Model Checking
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To overcome the limitations just described, in this work we
adopt a stateless model checking approach. Stateless model
checking explores all possible behaviors of the program or
model without storing the explored states in a visited set. The
program or model is executed by a scheduler that tracks all
the points of non-determinism in the program. The sched-
uler systematically explores all possible execution paths of
the program obtained by the non-deterministic choices. State-
less model checking is particularly suited for exploring the
state space of large models. In this work we instrument the
Brahms simulator to perform stateless model checking. The
instrumented code within the Brahms engine generates all
possible paths (each with different combinations of activity
durations) in depth-ﬁrst ordering. Stateless model checkers
like VeriSoft [14] do not in general store paths; however, in
order to perform further analysis of the behaviors space the
Brahms stateless model checker can store all the generated
paths in a database.
Non-determinism in Brahms
There are two main points of non-determinism in Brahms
models. The ﬁrst point of non-determinism is due to dura-
tions of primitive activities. The different primitive activi-
ties in Brahms have a duration in seconds associated with
them. The duration of the primitive activity can either be
ﬁxed or can vary based on certain attributes of the primitive
activities. When the random attribute of a primitive activ-
ity is set to true the simulator randomly selects the primitive
activity duration between the min and max durations speci-
ﬁed for the activity. The second point of non-determinism
arises from probabilistic updates to facts and beliefs of agents
and objects. Updates to facts and beliefs are made using
conclude statements in Brahms. An example of a con-
clude statement is: conclude((Pilot.checkStall
= false), bc:70, fc:70). This states that the belief
and fact, checkStall, in the Pilot agent will be updated to false
with a probability of 70%. Here bc represents belief certainty
while fc represents fact certainty.
In the U¨berlingen model currently there are only determinis-
tic updates to facts or beliefs. The updates to facts and beliefs
are asserted with a 100% probability. Nevertheless, there is a
large degree of non-determinism due to variations in activity
durations. The difference in minimum and maximum dura-
tion ranges from 2 seconds to a few hundred seconds. This
can potentially lead to a large number of timing differences
between the various events. In future work we plan to extend
the Brahms U¨berlingen model to support probabilistic varia-
tions in order to account for errors by humans and automated
systems.
Behavior Space
The scheduler within the stateless Brahms model checker
generates all possible paths through the different points of
non-determinism in the Brahms model. Note that in describ-
ing the output of the Brahms stateless model checker we use
the terms path and trace interchangeably. Intuitively, a path
(or trace) generated by the Brahms stateless model checker
is equivalent to the a single simulation run. More formally,
a path or trace is a sequence of events executed by the sim-
ulator 〈e0, e1, e2, . . . , ei〉. Each event in the trace is a tuple,
〈a, t, (u, val)〉 where a is the actor id, t is the Brahms clock
time, u is the fact or belief updated to the value val . For
each trace we generate a sequence of nodes in the intermedi-
ate representation ninit , n0, n1, n2, . . . , ni. The initial node
in the sequence, ninit is labeled with the initial values of be-
lief/facts values for the various agents and objects. The event
e0 := 〈a0, t0, (u0, val0)〉 is applied to the initial node ninit
where the value assigned to u0 is updated to val0. Each event
is applied in sequence to a node in the intermediate represen-
tation to generate ninit , n0, n1, n2, . . . , ni.
Summary of the Results
There are several activities in the Brahms U¨berlingen model
with a speciﬁed range of minimum and maximum durations.
Due to the size and complexity of the model, generating a
single trace takes approximately 15 minutes. It would in all
likelihood take a few weeks to generate all possible traces
within the system. In order to mitigate this computational
bottleneck, we scope the veriﬁcation of the model. We non-
deterministically explore the minimum, median, and maxi-
mum durations for each activity in the model. In the traces
generated by the stateless Brahms model checker, approxi-
mately a third of the generated traces lead to a collision. If
the collision was an undesired property (a fault) in the model,
then the results of the model checking would indicate a very
high error density. It is, however, important to note that the
goal of the collision conﬁguration in the Brahms U¨berlingen
model was to faithfully recreate the conditions that led to the
planes colliding. The veriﬁcation results demonstrate that
even with the timing variations a large number of paths (one-
third of the generated paths) lead to the collision due to the
fact that the ATCO was distracted with the AEF ﬂight, the
short-term collision avoidance system (STCA) which pro-
vides optical and audible alerts for the ATCO was under
maintenance, and the fact that there was only one ATCO on
duty.
We present an overview of the veriﬁcation results for the two
properties of interest described earlier: (a) how does the ar-
rival of the AEF ﬂight impact the ATCO’s ability to monitor
the large airspace and (b) does a collision always occur in this
period? Some of the results described in the simulation also
hold true for the traces generated during the veriﬁcation. We
were able to study other interesting aspects of the model with
respect to the properties that were not observed in the sim-
ulation. In the simulation runs of the U¨berlingen model the
ﬁnal AEF handoff (directing the pilots to contact the tower)
always occurs in the simulation after the TCAS RA; in the
veriﬁcation runs, however, the ﬁnal AEF hand-off can occur
before the TA is ever issued. Some of the cases observed are
as follows:
1. The ﬁnal AEF hand off occurs before the TA, the separa-
tion infringement is detected and resolved.
2. The ﬁnal AEF hand off occurs before the TA, and the
planes still collide. Note that this is a very interesting sce-
nario because the U¨berlingen accident report states that the
the ﬁnal AEF hand off occurred before the TA for either of
the planes.
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The veriﬁcation results indicate that while in some cases the
AEF ﬂight arrival can exacerbate the problem for the ATCO,
it is not the only cause of the accident. From a wider sys-
temic perspective, the separation violation did not occur at
U¨berligen only because of the arrival time of the AEF ﬂight.
Rather, the Skyguide company had tolerated a deviant form
of SMOP during night operations: consequently nobody was
carrying out the role of the supervisor in the ATC. Nobody
was responsible for the system, particularly during the main-
tenance process. Otherwise ATCOwould have been informed
that STCA Optical alert was not functioning and that the
backup phones had been disabled. We can encode the out-
put of the Brahms Stateless model checker into a PRISM
model, [17], and check various probabilistic properties of the
system. The updates to the facts and beliefs represent the
probabilistic updates to the system. Note that the output of
the Brahms stateless model checker can be encoded as the
intermediate representation in the work in [16].
The U¨berlingen collision scenario does not provide oppor-
tunity for sophisticated properties since a large number of
paths lead to the collision of the planes. The model, however,
lends itself to be extended to other general cases and scenarios
present in the aviation domain. For example, most pilots in
practice commonly ignore the TA alert issues by TCAS, but
are trained to react immediately to an RA. Rather than being
speciﬁed as initial conﬁguration we can extend the model to
support probabilistic updates that indicate whether or not the
phones are down, whether the STCA is in maintenance, and
the other ATCO ofﬁcer is on a break.
DISCUSSION
Our overall goal is to model and analyze interactions between
humans and automated systems, and apply this methodology
to the safety analysis of NextGen. It is our conjecture that
such an analysis needs to be done early in design before de-
ploying any new automation. The problems that are related
to safety which can be detected early in the design phase are
easier to ﬁx. In order to achieve this goal, we need to reason
about how humans perform their tasks in conjunction with
complex, thus hard to grasp in its entirety, automation. It led
us to making the following choices.
To model the interactions between humans and automation
we chose the Brahms modeling language. Brahms has the
ability to reason about agents and objects that can represent
humans as well as automated systems. The agents can have
varying levels of intelligence which provides us the ﬂexibil-
ity to model agents at varying granularity. The simulation of
agent behavior can range from rational procedure following
to simulating how people actually doing their work, i.e., their
practice, or simulating reactive behavior that is fragmented,
unfocused, incomplete, etc. We can encode non-deterministic
choices in the model and even assign probabilities to these
choices. We can also express the notion of belief, which is
quite important when a human interacts with a complex sys-
tem. For example, the pilot in charge during the Air France
447 accident described in [16] had wrong assumptions about
the pitch of the plane and being able to model his belief as to
the state of the system is important. Brahms also gives us the
added beneﬁt of being able to model precisely a working en-
vironment (e.g., a controller console is two yards away from
another one, which implies some time is needed to switch
from one to the other). Early in the design phase, details, in-
cluding those about work settings, are not necessarily known.
However, it is advantageous to have this feature when one
wants to reﬁne the analysis as one gets closer to deployment
at particular locations. Quite often FAA ground systems re-
quire adaptations when they are ﬁelded at new locations. Us-
ing Brahms’ capabilities, one can tune a generic model to the
details of a particular location and verify that no new safety
issues can appear.
From an analysis point of view, we are taking a pragmatic ap-
proach, adopting both simulations and model checking tech-
niques. In this work, we experimented with generating the
behaviors using a stateless model checker. The reachability
graph can also be generated by the JPF model checker as de-
scribed in [16] where currently a subset of the Brahms seman-
tics are implemented as a Java library. After completing the
implementation of the Brahms semantics in JPF we can lever-
age the several extensions of JPF to facilitate the scalability
of the analysis. Another important criterion is to provide the
ability to reason about beliefs and probabilistic behaviors. As
described in the veriﬁcation framework of [16], we can en-
code the reachability graph into inputs for different model
checkers such as PRISM, SPIN, and NuSMV. This allows us
to leverage state of the art veriﬁcation technologies and check
properties related to probabilities, liveness, and beliefs.
With respect to the methodology, it is important to reconcile
the need for details in an analysis with the fact of perform-
ing an analysis early in design when details are not necessar-
ily known. Our ﬁrst answer is based on using fairly generic
models for controllers and pilots based on the current litera-
ture (which includes the body of work in human factor stud-
ies). These generic models can then be reﬁned as we progress
towards implementation, adaptation, and ﬁnally deployment.
Scalability might still be an issue, and we will address it by
using proper abstractions and, if possible, compositional ver-
iﬁcation techniques. Similarly, we will have to address the
scalability of the models when it comes to analyzing larger
parts of the National Airspace System (e.g., multiple airports,
multiple sectors, many airplanes). Fortunately JPF is being
extended with capabilities to address abstractions and com-
positional veriﬁcation. So, we will have a good base from
which to draw.
RELATED WORK
In addition to the approaches mentioned in the Introduction,
there is a large body of work dealing with the veriﬁcation
of human-machine interactions and with the veriﬁcation of
avionic systems. The DO-178B titled Software considera-
tions in airborne systems and equipment certiﬁcation is the
ofﬁcial guideline for certifying avionics software. Several
model checking and formal veriﬁcation techniques have been
employed to verify avionic software in [19, 2] in accordance
with the DO-178B. Recent work describes how changes in
aircraft systems and in the air trafﬁc system pose new chal-
lenges for certiﬁcation, due to the increased interaction and
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integration [23].
In [19] the authors present a framework that supports mul-
tiple input formalisms to model avionic software: these in-
clude MATLAB Simulink/Stateﬂow and SCADE. These for-
malisms are then translated into an intermediate representa-
tion using Lustre, a standard modelling language employed to
model reactive systems with applications in avionics. Finally,
Lustre models are translated to the input language of various
model checkers, including NuSMV, PVS, and SAL. The key
difference with the approach we describe for formal veriﬁca-
tion is that the translation is purely syntactical. In our work,
instead, we do not translate the modelling language, but we
operate at the level of the Brahms simulator. This allows us to
consider the full semantics of Brahms, and not a subset of the
language compatible with the veriﬁcation tools. More impor-
tantly, we explicitly consider a hybrid system composed of
software and humans, and we are able to reason about beliefs
and probabilities, while the work in [19] is limited to tempo-
ral properties.
There is a vast literature to model human-machine interac-
tions. Recently, Combeﬁs et al. [12] have employed Java
Pathﬁnder as a model checker to verify human-machine in-
teractions. The modelling language is based on Statecharts
but, as in the work of [19], this formalism does not allow
us to reason about probabilities or beliefs. We refer to the
references available in [12] for an overview of other similar
approaches.
The work of Yasmeen and Gunter [25] deals with the veriﬁ-
cation of the behaviour of human operators to check the ro-
bustness of mixed systems. In this approach the authors em-
ploy concurrent game structures as the modelling language
and translate the veriﬁcation problem to a model checking in-
stance using SPIN. As in the previous cases, our approach is
different in that we do not perform syntactic translations and
we reason explicitly about probabilities and beliefs. Addi-
tionally, we also provide a detailed and complex case study.
The Enhanced Operator Function Model (EOFM) is another
modelling language developed to model and verify interac-
tions between humans and automated systems [7]. Similarly
to the other works described above, EOFM is translated into
the input language of the model checker SAL to perform ver-
iﬁcation of properties encoded in linear temporal logic. The
authors describe the application of their framework to the ver-
iﬁcation of a cruise control system for cars. The main lim-
itation of this approach is that it currently supports single-
operator systems only and, as in the case of [19] and [25],
there is no support to reason about probabilities and beliefs.
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